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I. IOTRODUCTION 
Codes of conduct for international business operations are prolif-
erating as investors, companies and governments confront demands 
to respect human and labor rights claims. Until recently, the link be-
tween increasing global economic activity and human rights was tenu-
ous. Investors and executives tended to see human rights as a matter 
for government officials and diplomats to implement, and resisted 
pressures to have their businesses used as tools for political reform. 
In a nutshell, as one critic of "corporate social responsibility" put it, 
"the company that seeks to pursue profit and do 'good works' at the 
same time is likely to do neither very well."1 
For their part, human rights activists tended to stress the most 
egregious violations of political and civil rights—arbitrary arrest and 
detention, torture, political killings, one-parry dictatorships and the 
like—without confronting deficiencies in the protection of labor 
rights, working conditions or the role of international business in 
countries where such abuses have occurred. International labor rights 
were defined very narrowly and technically and were largely seen as 
the concern of the International Labor Organization (ILO). The ILO 
is a Geneva-based United Nations agency that issues but has no pow-
er to enforce "conventions" approved by government, management 
and labor delegates to its annual conferences.2 
The globalization of the economy and the globalization of hu-
man rights concerns, both important phenomena in the second half of 
this century, developed separately from each other. Though the inter-
national community enacted elaborate charters, covenants and conven-
tions that covered labor rights and labor conditions, these mainly 
remained statements of intent rather than guides to actual practice/ 
1. See B.J. McCabe, Are Corporations Socially Responsible? Is Corporate Social 
Responsibility Desirable?, 4 BOND L. REV. 2, 18 (1992). 
2. To date, the ILO has adopted 177 Conventions. Most deal with working conditions 
in specific industries or employment sectors. A half-dozen are considered to constitute a 
"human rights core" of ILO Conventions covering freedom of association, the right to orga-
nize and bargain collectively, forced labor, child labor, discrimination, and minimum accept-
able conditions as to wages, hours and workplace health and safety. See Human Rights—A 
Common Responsibility, International Labor Organization (1988) (report of the Director 
General). 
3. The principal international instruments addressing labor rights concerns are the 
United Nations Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the two international covenants 
that flow from the declaration: the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, and 
the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, and what the Interna-
tional Labor Organization (ILO) calls its core human rights conventions. Regional groupings 
like the Organization of American States and the European Union have analogous provisions 
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The anti-apartheid movement of the 1970s and 80s is a promi-
nent exception to the general "delinking" of human rights and interna-
tional business practices in the area of labor rights. The widespread 
rejection of a legal system based on racial chscrimination prompted 
broad public pressure against U.S.-based multinational corporations 
active in South Africa. This pressure began with the "Sullivan Princi-
ples," a 1977 code of conduct for U.S. companies in South Africa 
that prohibited discriminatory practices against Black and Colored 
South Africans in employment, employee housing conditions and job 
advancement opportunities.4 
In addition to its contents, the Sullivan Principles established an 
elaborate audit mechanism administered by an independent accounting 
and consulting firm to ensure compliance. However, the Sullivan 
Principles did not retain lasting importance because the author of the 
Principles later declared them to be ineffectual in overcoming apart-
in their basic charters. See, e.g., Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A-
(III), U.N. GAOR, 3d Sess., pt. 1 at 71, U.N. Doc. A/810 (1948); International Covenant on 
Civil and Political Rights, G.A. Res. 2200 (XXI), U.N. GAOR 21st Sess., Supp. No. 16, at 
52, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966); International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights, G.A. Res. 2200 (XXI), U.N. GAOR, 21st Sess., Supp. No. 16, at 49, U.N. Doc. 
A/6316 (1966); ILO, Convention No. 87 Concerning Freedom of Association and Protection 
of the Right to Organise, 1 INTERNATIONAL LABOR CONVENTIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
1919-1991 435 (1992) (convention entered into force July 4,1950); ILO, Convention No. 98 
Concerning the Application of the Principles of the Right to Organise and Bargain Collec-
tively, 1 INTERNATIONAL LABOR CONVENTIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 1919-1991 524 
(1992) (convention entered into force July 18, 1951); ILO, Convention No. 105 Concerning 
the Abolition of Forced Labour, 1 INTERNATIONAL LABOR CONVENTIONS AND RECOMMEN-
DATIONS 1919-1991 618 (convention entered into force January 17, 1959); ILO Convention 
No. Ill Concerning Discrimination in Respect of Employment and Occupation, 1 INTERNA-
TIONAL LABOR CONVENTIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 1919-1991 702 (convention entered 
into force June 15, 1960); ILO, Convention No. 138 Concerning the Minimum Age for 
Admission to Employment 1 INTERNATIONAL LABOR CONVENTIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
1919-1991 1030 (convention entered into force June 19,1976) (1992); American Convention 
on Human Rights, OAS Official Records, OEA/Ser.A/16, T.S. No. 36 (Nov. 22, 1969); 
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Europ. T.S. 
No.5 (Nov. 4, 1950); European Social Charter, 529 U.N.T.S. 89 (October 18, 1961). 
4. Reverend Leon Sullivan was a prominent Philadelphia clergyman and a member of 
the board of directors of the General Motors Corporation. His Principles were a voluntary 
code of conduct to which U.S. companies would pledge compliance and report on their steps 
to effectuate the principles. Jacqueline Trescott, Principles and Palates, WASH. POST, Nov. 
30, 1979, at C3. Companies that refused to "take the pledge" or failed to live up to the 
Principles requirements faced adverse publicity that might be detrimental to their own eco-
nomic interest For a recent discussion of the Sullivan Principles in the context of voluntary 
corporate codes of conduct, see Daniel Pink, The Valdez Principles: Is What's Good for Am-
erica Good for General Motors?, 8 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 180, 181-185 (1990). 
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heid,5 and because they were later superseded by congressional pas-
sage of comprehensive economic sanctions against South Africa.6 
In the past ten years the general resistance to linking human and 
labor rights to international business practices has begun to break 
down. Since 1984, U.S. trade statutes have been amended to include 
labor rights conditionality in trade preference programs,7 a side ac-
cord covering labor rights was negotiated as part of the North Ameri-
can Free Trade Agreement,8 litigation has emerged in U.S. courts 
over international labor rights disputes,9 U.S. unions have moved 
aggressively to develop international solidarity programs with foreign 
workers and unions, an agreement was reached in the Uruguay 
Round of GATT negotiations to include worker rights issues in the 
agenda of the new World Trade Organization,11 and more U.S.-based 
firms have developed codes of conduct on worker rights and working 
conditions for foreign subsidiaries and suppliers.12 
5. See Karen Paul, The Inadequacy of Sullivan Reporting, 57 Bus. & SOC. R. 61 
(1986); Leon Sullivan, The Sullivan Principles and Change in South Africa, in BUSINESS IN 
THE CONTEMPORARY WORLD 175 (Herbert L. Sawyer, ed., 1988). 
6. Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act of 1986, 22 U.S.C. §§ 5001-5116 (1988). 
7. See Jorge Perez-Lopez, Conditioning Trade on Foreign Labor Law: The U.S. App-
roach, 9 COMP. LAB. L.J. 253 (1988). For a criticism of the U.S. approach to international 
labor rights as reflected in these statutes, see Philip Alston, Labor Rights Provisions in U.S. 
Trade Law: "Aggressive Unilateralism"?, 15 HUM. RTS. Q. 1 (1993); T. Amato, Labor 
Rights Conditionality: United States Trade Legislation and the International Trade Order, 
65 N.Y.U. L. REV. 79 (1990); Note, In Pursuit of the Missing Link: International Worker 
Rights and International Trade?, 27 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 443 (1989). For a defense 
of such clauses, see JOHN CAVANAGH ET.AL., TRADE'S HIDDEN COSTS: WORKER RIGHTS IN 
A CHANGING WORLD ECONOMY (1988); T. Collingsworth, American Labor Policy and the 
International Economy: Clarifying Policies and Interests, 21 B.C. L. REV. 1 (1989). 
8. See North American Agreement on Labor Cooperation, Sept. 14, 1993, U.S.-Can.-
Mex. 32 I.L.M 1499. For a discussion on this subject, see Lance Compa, The First NAFTA 
Labor Cases: A New International Labor Rights Regime Takes Shape, 3 U.S.-MEX. L.J. 159 
(1995). 
9. See, e.g., Osorio v. INS, 18 F.3d 1017 (2d Cir. 1994); Labor Union of Pico Korea 
v. Pico Products, 968 F.2d 191 (2d Cir. 1992); Dow Chemical Co. v. Castro-Alfaro, 786 
S.W.2d 674 (Tex. 1990); Van Blaricom v. Burlington Northern, 17 F.3d 1224 (9th Cir. 
1994); Longshoremen ILA (Coastal Stevedoring Co.), 313 N.L.R.B. 412 (1993). 
10. See, e.g., U.E.-F.A.T. Strategic Organizing Alliance, Statement on Joint Work (Feb. 
1992)(a program devised by the United Electrical, Radio and Machine Workers of America 
(UE), a U.S. union, and the Frente Autentico de Trabajadores, a Mexican labor federation, 
for coordinated union organizing campaigns in the maquiladora sector.)(on file with the 
author). 
11. See Alan Riding, U.S. Gains a Trade Forum for Labor-Equity Issues, N.Y. TIMES, 
Apr. 8, 1994, at D6. 
12. For a discussion, see Diane F. Orenthlicher and Timothy A. Gelatt, Public Law, 
Private Actors: The Impact of Human Rights on Business Investors in China, 14 Nw. J. INT'L 
L. & BUS. 66 (1993). 
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This paper examines the last of these new developments: codes 
of conduct on labor rights promulgated in the private sector for or by 
multinational corporations. The issue has taken on a new urgency in 
the wake of the Clinton administration's 1994 decision to maintain 
China's most-favored-nation (MEN) trade status despite its record of 
widespread human and labor rights violations.13 Responding to criti-
cism at that time, the Administration promoted a voluntary code of 
conduct for U.S. companies doing business in China.14 It later ex-
panded the proposal to embrace all overseas operations of U.S.-based 
multinational corporations.15 
The Clinton administration's idea for a corporate code of con-
duct is not new. In response to growing pressure over labor issues, 
several U.S. companies involved in global business have begun creat-
ing corporate codes of conduct that, inter alia, address workers' 
rights. As a Reebok spokesman stated, "[cjonsumers today hold com-
panies accountable for the way products are made, not just the quality 
of the product itself."16 
Codes of conduct for labor rights are taking shape as part of a 
broader movement of corporate social responsibility. The premise of 
the corporate social responsibility movement is that "corporations, 
because they are the dominant institution of the planet, must squarely 
face and address the social and environmental problems that afflict 
humankind."17 The most visionary exponents of this movement call 
for a redesign of the current system of commerce to one where "do-
ing good is second nature, in which natural, everyday acts of work 
and life cumulate into a better world as a matter of course, not a 
13. See, e.g., Keith Bradsher, Prison Labor Seen in Chinese Imports, N.Y. TIMES, Sept 
24,1991, at A9; Daniel Southerland, China Said to Still Use Forced Labor: Report Contends 
Exports Violate Pact, Threaten Favored Trade Status, WASH. POST, May 19, 1993, at F3. 
14. See Edward A. Gargan, Business Objects to a Code in China, N.Y. TIMES, May 24, 
1994, at D2; Steven Mufson, For U.S. Firms, A Struggle Over Rights and Roles, WASH. 
POST, Aug. 25, 1994, at BIO. 
15. See David E. Sanger, Clinton to Urge A Rights Code For Businesses Dealing 
Abroad, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 27, 1995, at Dl. The new proposal generated a new round of 
criticism at the alleged weakness of the Administration's "Model Business Principles." See, 
e.g., Clay Chandler, "Code of Conduct" Draft Assailed: Rights Groups Criticize Administra-
tion 's Rules for U.S. Firms Abroad, WASH. POST, Mar. 28,1995, at D4; A.M. Rosenthal, The 
Limp Noodle, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 28, 1995, at A19; Steven Mufson, The Beijing Duck: What 
U.S. Firms in China Don't Do for Human Rights, WASH. POST, Apr. 9, 1995, at CI. 
16. See Human Rights Production Standards Set in Worldwide Reebok Initiative, REE-
BOK MAKING A DIFFERENCE (June 1993) (company newsletter, on file with author). 
17. Paul Hawken & William McDonough, Seven Steps to Doing Good Business, INC. 
Nov. 1993, at 79, 80. 
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matter of altruism."18 
Beyond altruism and doing good as "a matter of course" lies a 
more immediate self-interested motive. One observer made the fol-
lowing observation: 
. . . deteriorating social circumstances put at risk our ability to 
satisfy customers, provide a stable work environment, and meet 
our obligations to stockholders.... Business must actively con-
tinue to help ensure that the community has the economic poli-
cies to support business, the educational system to produce the 
workers of tomorrow, and the quality of life necessary to attract 
and retain employees.19 
II. EXTERNAL CODES OF CONDUCT 
Before exaniining codes of conduct generated within the multi-
national enterprise, a look at externally generated codes of conduct 
suggests why companies are developing their own internal norms. 
There are two main types of external codes: those created in multilat-
eral government settings and those developed by either governments 
or non-governmental organizations (NGOs) that are offered to compa-
nies for acceptance either through outright adoption or through a 
pledge to comply with their terms. 
A. Multilateral Government-Initiated Codes 
1. The United Nations Code 
The United Nations has formulated but never formally adopted 
a Code of Conduct for Transnational Corporations (UN Code)?0 It 
was promoted in the early and mid-1970s at a time when the "Group 
of 77," an organization of developing countries, was aggressively 
confronting the industrialized world.21 Evidence of malfeasance by 
multinational corporations (such as ITT's involvement in the 1973 
18. Id. at 80. 
19. George B. Harvey, The Education of American Business, 83 Bus. & Soc'Y REV. 
62-63 (1992). 
20. See Development and International Economic Cooperation: Transnational Cor-
porations, U.N. Economic and Social Commission, 2d Sess., Agenda Item 7(d), at 1, U.N. 
Doc. E/1990/94 (1990). 
21. See E.S.C. Res. 1908, UN. ESCOR, 57th Sess., Supp. No. 1, at 13, UN. Doc. El 
5570 (1974); E.S.C. Res. 1913, U.N. ESCOR, 57th Sess., Supp. No. 1A, at 3, UN. Doc. 
5570/Add. 1 (1975). 
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overthrow of Chilean President Salvador Allende) also provided 
the impetus for a UN-drafted corporate code of conduct 
The UN Code refers to human rights and fair treatment of work-
ers in a very general manner, requiring, for example, that "[trans-
national corporations shall respect human rights and fundamental 
freedoms in the countries in which they operate. In their social and 
industrial relations, transnational corporations shall not discriminate 
on the basis of race, colour, sex, language, social, national and ethnic 
origin or political or other opinion."23 
Since the time this code was drafted, however, third world con-
frontation has largely given way to integration into a liberalized glob-
al economy. For most of the developing world, multinational compa-
nies are now prized investors, not malfeasors.24 The UN Code stands 
as a worthy statement of principle, but until it is adopted it will re-
main just that and nothing more. 
2. The OECD Code 
The Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development 
(OECD) established its Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises in 
1976,25 also in response to concerns about corporate interference in 
national political affairs. The code recognizes the right of labor to 
organize and bargain collectively and requires employers to provide 
facilities and information to union representatives so that they may 
engage in meaningful bargaining. The OECD code also mandates that 
companies furnish financial and strategic information to unions so 
that the latter may "obtain a true and fair view" of a company's oper-
ations. It further bans discrimination in employment, requires corpora-
tions to give advance notice of layoffs and to cooperate with unions 
to mitigate the effects of layoffs, and calls on management not to 
threaten plant closures or layoffs to influence contract negotiations or 
22. See Multinational Corporations and United States Foreign Policy: Hearings before 
the Subcomm. on Multinational Corporations of the Senate Comm. on Foreign Relations, 
94th Cong., 1st Sess., 381-86 (1975). 
23. U.N. Economic and Social Commission, supra note 20. 
24. See, e.g., John F. Burns, India Now Winning U.S. Investment: A Boom in Deals as 
Socialism Wanes, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 6, 1995, at Dl; James Brooke, Brazil Paves Way for 
More Foreign Investment, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 17, 1995, at A8. 
25. See OECD, Declaration on International Investment and Multinational Enterprises 
(originally written in 1976, revised in 1979), in DUNCAN C. CAMPBELL & RICHARD L. ROW-
AN, MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISES AND THE OECD INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS GUIDELINES 243 
(1983). 
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to interfere with the right to organize. 
Although the OECD avoids making specific findings of miscon-
duct by individual companies under its code, it provides a complaint 
procedure that can result in "clarifications" of the guidelines as they 
apply to particular labor-management disputes. There is no coercive 
enforcement mechanism to ensure compliance with the guidelines, but 
workers and trade unions have occasionally achieved successful reso-
lution of disputes through recourse to the OECD.27 
3. The ILO Code 
The ILO has elaborated a Tripartite Declaration of Principles 
Concerning Multinational Enterprises and Social Policy.28 The ILO 
code has a broader range than that of the OECD, extending to such 
issues as job creation, investment in the local economy, subcontract-
ing and the like. It also provides for a more detailed complaint proce-
dure before a Standing Committee on Multinational Enterprises em-
powered to investigate and make specific findings of code violations 
by individual companies. However, like the OECD code, the ILO 
Declaration has no sanctions to back up its rules. Enforcement is 
more a matter of discreet persuasion by OECD or ILO officials, or 
public embarrassment through the media.29 
B. Privately-Drawn "Sign-Up" Codes of Conduct 
1. The MacBride Code 
The Sullivan Principles discussed earlier remain the most promi-
nent example of a corporate code of conduct drafted by a private 
party with whose terms individual companies pledged to comply. This 
approach was also used in the "MacBride Principles,"30 a code of 
conduct issued in 1984 by the noted Irish statesman Sean MacBride 
which was designed to influence the activities of U.S. companies 
doing business in Northern Ireland. This code requires non-discrimi-
26. Id. at 251-253. 
27. Id. See also JOHN ROBINSON, MULTINATIONALS AND POLITICAL CONTROL (1983). 
28. See ILO, Tripartite Declaration of Principles Concerning Multinational Enterprises 
and Social Policy (1977), in CAMPBELL & ROWAN, supra note 25, at 254. 
29. For a discussion of cases arising under the ILO Declaration, see B. Glade & E. 
Potter, Targeting the Labor Practices of Multinational Companies, FOCUS ON ISSUES (U.S. 
Council for International Business, 1989). 
30. See Jorge Perez-Lopez, Promoting International Respect for Worker Rights through 
Business Codes of Conduct, 17 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 1, 9-12 (1993). 
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nation and affirmative action programs in order to overcome the deep 
antipathy between the Protestant majority and the Roman Catholic 
minority in that British-ruled territory.31 
2. The Slepak and Miller Codes 
The "Slepak Principles"32 and "Miller Principles"33 sought to 
create codes of conduct for multinational companies doing business 
in the Soviet Union and in China. The Slepak code, named in honor 
of a well-known Soviet dissident, was issued in 1988 by a private 
foundation. The Miller principles were contained in a 1991 bill intro-
duced by a U.S. congressman, Rep. John Miller of Washington state. 
Both principally dealt with forced labor issues and military-related 
industrial projects. However, in the wake of the Soviet Union's dis-
solution and continuing U.S. corporate interest in investment opportu-
nities in China, neither has attracted much support.34 
3. The Maquiladora Code 
Concerns about pollution, unsafe working conditions and pov-
erty-level wages in the maquiladora factory zone along the border 
with Mexico have led to the issuance of a code of conduct for U.S. 
companies with operations in this area. Promoted by the APL-CIO 
and a coalition of religious and environmental groups, the "Maquila-
dora Standards of Conduct" code appeals to U.S. corporations to pro-
mote a healthy environment, a safe workplace and an adequate stan-
dard of living for workers.35 
The Maquiladora code addresses hazardous waste disposal, che-
mical leaks, and transportation of toxic materials. It requires disclo-
sure to workers and communities on the use and risks of chemicals 
and other hazardous materials, calls for workplace health and safety 
committees, protects the right to organize and bargain, bans discrimi-
nation (including sexual harassment), and requires a higher minimum 
wage and limits on working hours. Finally, this code would abolish 
barracks-style living quarters for workers, and establish a trust fund 
to improve housing, health care, and sanitary services.36 However, 
31. Id. 
32. Id. at 12-16. 
33. Id. at 16-19 
34. Id. at 12-19, 32-35. 
35. See INTERFAITH CENTER FOR CORPORATE RESPONSIBILITY, MAQUILADORA STAN-
DARDS OF CONDUCT (1991). 
36. Id. at 16. 
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as of mid-1994, only one corporation, Asarco, reportedly had commit-
ted itself to abide by the Maquiladora Standards of Conduct.37 
4. The "Rugmark" Campaign 
An innovative effort to use the protection of labor rights as a 
marketing device for manufacturers and distributors has arisen with 
the formulation of the "Rugmark" campaign. In September 1994, a 
new U.S.-based Child Labor Coalition launched its "U.S. Consumer 
Education Campaign for the 'RUGMARK.'"38 Already underway 
in Germany, the campaign was devised by Indian carpet industry 
representatives, the South Asian Coalition on Child Servitude, and the 
Indo-German Promotion Council. They created the Rugmark Founda-
tion, which receives funding to develop and implement a monitoring 
program to ensure that companies entitled to use the Rugmark label 
do not use child labor and comply with the applicable labor protec-
tion laws of India, Pakistan and Nepal. Companies must register their 
looms with the Foundation and agree to permit surprise visits by 
Foundation inspectors to obtain their Rugmark certification.39 
In Germany, carpet wholesalers and retailers are asked to agree 
to buy only Rugmark-certified products. They are then permitted to 
use the Rugmark label themselves and to publicize the fact that con-
sumers can purchase carpets that were manufactured without the use 
of child labor.40 In December of 1994, Rugmark Campaign repre-
sentatives wrote to the ten largest carpet retailers in the United States 
asking for a similar commitment. They stressed that alignment with 
the Campaign "could bring significant press attention to its positive 
marketing strategy and its social conscience."41 It is too soon to 
37. See Activists Reached a Variety of Agreements in Withdrawing All 10 Maquiladora 
Resolutions, NEWS FOR INVESTORS (Investor Responsibility Research Center) May 1992, at 
15. 
38. See CLC Launches RUGMARK Consumer Campaign, IV CHILD LABOR MONITOR 
1-2 (Sept. 1994) (National Consumers League publication). 
39. See the following publications of the Rugmark Foundation: What you need to do 
to become Licensee ofRUGMARK, RUGMARK Application, RUGMARK License Agreement, 
RUGMARK Criteria, Inspection Modalities (on file with author; available from Child Labor 
Coalition, U.S. National Consumers League). 
40. Interview with Pharis Harvey, Executive Director, International Labor Rights Edu-
cation and Research Fund and Co-Chair, RUGMARK CAMPAIGN, (Jan. 13, 1995). 
41. See Letter from Pharis J. Harvey and Linda Golodner, Co-Chairs, RUGMARK 
CAMPAIGN, to chief executive officers of the ten largest home furnishing retailers selling 
oriental rugs (Dec. 13,1994) (on file with author, available from Child Labor Coalition). The 
selection of companies and the strategy for implementing the Rugmark Campaign in the 
United States is contained in a study titled Rugmark and the U.S. Rug Industry: A Strategy 
for Effective Interaction, prepared by POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC LINK CONSULTANCY (1994). 
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know whether this campaign will have an effect in the massive and 
diverse U.S. market, but it reflects a creative attempt to turn respect 
for international labor rights, at least on the child labor question, into 
an advantage in global trade. 
IE. INTERNAL CORPORATE CODES OF CONDUCT 
Broad codes of conduct sponsored by groups seeking the accep-
tance and compliance of multinational corporations have not had 
much success in attracting company adherents. Of the examples just 
noted, only the Sullivan Principles attracted broad support from U.S. 
companies, and these companies were motivated more by potential 
adverse reactions from consumers in their domestic market then from 
a desire to "do good". Even then, they came under fire from critics 
who contended that signatories to the Sullivan Principles were using 
them "as camouflage—as a justification for operating in (and profit-
ing from) a fundamentally corrupt and odious system."42 
Understandably, international business managers resist a "one 
size fits all" approach that includes a review of compliance by parties 
not associated with the corporation. But increasingly companies are 
being pressured to better protect human and labor rights in their in-
ternational operations. First, companies face potentially damaging 
enforcement of unilateral U.S. labor rights legislation, a new North 
American labor rights regime under the NAFTA side agreement on 
labor, the emergence of worker rights in the new GATT/WTO sys-
tem, innovative litigation by foreign employees claiming worker 
rights violations and other developments that can affect relations with 
employees and governments in countries where they do business.43 
The occasional media expose on the use of child or prison labor, 
or on the creation of environmental hazards, also affects attitudes in 
multinational companies' target markets. Companies that are the most 
vulnerable to such exposes are those whose sales depend heavily on 
The study concludes that 
Without an effective campaign to industry, the consumer education campaign 
is almost certain to generate enthusiasm for which there is no outlet and expec-
tations which cannot be met, Rugmark's potential will be realized only if inter-
action with industry is pursued through a strategy which is based on the moral 
foundation of the issue, maximizes the opportunities for cooperation with the 
industry, and is synchronized effectively with the consumer education cam-
paign. 
Id. at 26. 
42. See Pink, supra note 4, at 189. 
43. See supra notes 7-11. 
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brand image and company goodwill, such as Levi Strauss. As one 
analyst points out, "[i]n a global marketplace with almost instant 
communications, there are no hiding places for companies. Interna-
tional media will expose inconsistency and irresponsibility in corpo-
rate behavior, and vigilant consumers will respond.'*44 
Multinational companies are also feeling pressures in board 
rooms, shareholder meetings and from sources of capital.45 Resolu-
tions on protections for human and labor rights are commonly pro-
posed to boards of directors and offered at annual meetings.46 Such 
resolutions traditionally have been proposed by religious orders or 
non-profit groups that hold tiny shares of company stock to gain 
access to shareholder meetings. Now, however, larger institutional 
investors and a new breed of "socially conscious" mutual funds with 
real financial clout also are raising questions and making demands 
about human and labor rights protections.47 
Many companies have chosen a pro-active route and have begun 
to fashion their own, self-initiated and self-supervised, codes of con-
duct for human and labor rights for their international subsidiaries and 
suppliers. The U.S.-based firms that are in the forefront of this mov-
ement are Levi Strauss & Co., Reebok Corp. and Starbucks Coffee 
Co. 
A. Levi Strauss & Co. Terms of Engagement and Guidelines 
In 1985, the descendants of the founder of Levi Strauss & Co. 
took the company private in a $1.6 billion leveraged buyout. In doing 
so, they hoped to revive the company's history of value-based deci-
sion making. As a privately-held company with no shareholders to 
convince, Levi Strauss can go farther and faster with corporate social 
responsibility initiatives than its competitors. Levi Strauss's interna-
tional code of conduct is just part of a broad-based program for a 
socially conscious approach to business. 
The Levi Strauss Mission Statement declares that "[w]e will 
44. See Martha Nichols, Third-World Families at Work: Child Labor or Child Care?, 
HARV. BUS. REV. 22 (Jan.-Feb. 1993). 
45. For a discussion, see Timothy H. Smith, Pressure from Above, 81 Bus. & Soc'Y 
REV. 36 (1992). 
46. Id. at 37. 
47. See, e.g., Francis Flaherty, Nice Profits, Hard Ethics For Political Correctness, N.Y. 
TIMES, Nov. 27, 1993, at 33; Carole Gould, A Social Responsibility Shake-Up, N.Y. TIMES, 
June 12, 1994, §3, at 14; Albert B. Crenshaw, Where Responsibility Meets Accountability, 
WASH. POST, NOV. 28, 1994, (Washington Business), at 5. 
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conduct our business ethically and demonstrate leadership in satis-
fying our responsibilities to our communities and to society. Our 
work environment will be safe and productive and characterized by 
fair treatment, teamwork, open communications, personal accountabil-
ity and opportunities for growth and development."48 
The adoption of sourcing standards for overseas suppliers is held 
out as an extension of Levi Strauss company values. "As we expand 
our production to more diverse cultures and countries, it makes sense 
to select partners whose practices are compatible with our aspirational 
and ethical values,"49 stated a company official. At the same time, 
such policies also serve to protect the company's valuable brand im-
age. The official went on to say, "fojtherwise we may end up with 
contractors who don't abide by responsible business policies, and our 
association with them could damage the image of our brands and our 
company."50 A Levi Strauss vice president responsible for offshore 
sourcing points out, "[w]e'll pay more to deal with reputable people 
who take care of their employees and maintain our brand image."51 
"Sourcing decisions which emphasize cost to the exclusion of all 
other factors will not best serve our long-term business interests," 
concludes an internal company analysis.52 
In September of 1991, Levi Strauss senior officials appointed a 
management task force, called the Sourcing Guidelines Working 
Group (SGWG), to develop its Global Sourcing Guidelines. The 14-
member group was drawn from eight divisions within the company 
to reflect its broad internal interests. The Group was charged with 
taking into account the concerns of all the company's "stakeholders," 
including its employees, customers and the communities in which the 
company operates. 
The SGWG reviewed the UN's Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights and other international human rights instruments53 in formu-
lating its recommended country and supplier guidelines. In February 
1992, the SGWG presented its guidelines to the Executive Manage-
ment Committee for approval. The guidelines were approved in 
48. Levi Strauss & Co., "Mission Statement," LS&Co. Human Resource Policies, June 
1, 1992 (on file with author). 
49. See Levi Strauss & Co., Sourcing Guidelines Working Group Report to Executive 
Management Committee, at 14 (1993) (on file with author) [hereinafter Sourcing Guidelines 
Report]. 
50. Id. 
51. Id. 
52. Id. 
53. See supra note 3. 
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March 1992 with a certain eagerness, because their adoption followed 
soon after an embarrassing media expose of abusive labor conditions 
in factories in Saipan, a U.S. protectorate, that supplied Levi Strauss, 
Sears and other U.S. retailers.54 
1. Levi Strauss' Labor Rights Code 
Titled "Business Partner Terms of Engagement and Guidelines 
for Country Selection," the Levi Strauss code of conduct is a two-part 
instrument which distinguishes it from other corporate codes of con-
duct. The first part, the "terms of engagement," covers environmental 
requirements, ethical, health and safety standards, legal requirements 
and employment practice guidelines to the extent that they are "issues 
that are substantially controllable by our individual business partners." 
In contrast, the second part's "guidelines for country selection" en-
tails, "issues which we believe are beyond the ability of the individual 
business partner to control." It addresses issues of brand image, 
health and safety, human rights, legal requirements and political or 
social stability, to the extent that each of them turns on the policies 
of the government in countries where Levi Strauss maintains opera-
tions or contracts with suppliers, rather than the employment policies 
of the supplier.55 
The "employment practices" section of the terms of engagement 
is the only one of the terms or guidelines itself broken down in great-
er detail, addressing six specific types of employment conditions to 
be regulated: wages and benefits, working hours, child labor, prison 
labor/forced labor, discrimination and disciplinary practices (namely, 
"corporal punishment or other forms of mental or physical coercion"). 
From a labor rights perspective, however, the Levi Strauss code of 
conduct has a significant omission. It does not include the right to 
form and join trade unions and the right to bargain collectively, 
norms otherwise contained in every international human rights instru-
ment that addresses labor concerns. 
Levi Strauss has gone beyond a simply hortatory use of its code 
of conduct on human and labor rights. The company has created an 
elaborate internal monitoring and enforcement system that begins with 
a detailed questionnaire on employment practices in foreign supplier 
plants. It also provides for audits that can include surprise site visits, 
54. For an account of the expose, see A Stitch in Time, ECONOMIST, June 6, 1992, at 
27. 
55. Levi Strauss & Co., Business Partner Terms of Engagement and Guidelines for 
Country Selection (1992)(on file with author). 
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intense review by company personnel charged with enforcing the code 
of conduct, and the termination of violators' contracts. 
The company applies its enforcement procedures in a flexible fash-
ion, taking a three-tiered approach to suppliers that violate its stan-
dards. The first level of implementation applies to those contractors 
whose practices are unworkable where the "business partners" appear 
indifferent and unwilling to improve the situation. These relation-
ships are terminated. The second level looks at operations where 
there is some concern over conditions but there appears to be the 
possibility for improvement. Levi Strauss sets out a plan and a time-
frame for resolving the problems. If goals are met, Levi Strauss will 
maintain a relationship with that contractor. If not, the relationship is 
ended. The third level applies to those contractors who appear to 
fulfill the requirements of the terms of engagement but could do 
more. A severance of relations is not threatened, but Levi Strauss 
continues to work with the supplier in an effort to make it a model 
partner. 
One of the first applications of the Levi Strauss code of conduct 
followed a burst of publicity in 1992 about working conditions in 
supplier factories in Saipan. There were reports about a factory own-
er who forced virtual slave conditions on his employees. Many of the 
workers were immigrants housed in padlocked barracks with their 
passports confiscated during their contract period. They were working 
as much as 11 hours a day, seven days a week, for as little as $1.65 
an hour with no overtime pay (the minimum wage in Saipan is $2.15 
an hour).56 The stories were especially embarrassing since Saipan 
is a U.S. protectorate governed by American labor law as part of the 
Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands. All goods produced 
there may be labeled "Made in the USA" and shipped without quota 
limits or duties.57 
Levi Strauss code of conduct auditors inspected the Saipan facto-
ries using their 10-page terms of engagement questionnaire. The 
company quickly canceled its contract with those suppliers. In addi-
tion, contracts with suppliers in the Philippines, Honduras and Uru-
guay were terminated when the auditors found that they failed to 
"conduct their business consistent with a set of ethical values not 
inconsistent with those of Levi Strauss & Co."58 In all, Levi Strauss 
terminated contracts with thirty suppliers worldwide, and forced re-
56. See supra note 54, at 27. 
57. Id. 
58. Sourcing Guidelines Report, supra note 49, at 14. 
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forms in employment practices in over one hundred others. 
In Bangladesh, Levi Strauss undertook an innovative program to 
address child labor conditions in two supplier plants where the com-
pany discovered that children under fourteen years of age were work-
ing. After a dialogue with local officials, an agreement was reached 
wherein the children returned to school but continued drawing pay 
from the contractor. Levi Strauss paid for their school tuition, books 
and uniforms, and the children will be offered jobs when they turn 
fourteen.60 
Applying its guidelines for country selection, Levi Strauss code 
of conduct auditors cross-checked its suppliers with a list of facilities 
in China reported to utilize prison labor. They also conducted surprise 
inspections of Chinese supplier plants, and visited each supplier to 
inquire about their use of prison labor.61 Similar measures were un-
dertaken in Burma, where a repressive military regime crushed a 
human rights movement.62 As a result, the company announced that 
it would entirely withdraw from both countries. 
Adoption of codes of conduct such as Levi Strauss & Comp-
any's terms of engagement provide a framework for acceptable busi-
ness partner behavior. One Levi Strauss official points out that the 
code benefits its business partners as well. "Contractors value listing 
us as a client for sourcing. If they can meet our requirements, it 
means they can work for anybody in the industry."64 
B. Reebok's Human Rights Initiatives and Production Standards 
Reebok Corp. has developed an innovative international human 
rights advocacy program that includes sponsoring rock concerts to 
raise funds for human rights organizations, giving Reebok Foundation 
grants to human rights organizations and annual Human Rights 
Awards to individual human rights activists, and issuing a code of 
59. See John McCormick & Marc Levinson, The Supply Police, 
NEWSWEEK, February 15, 1993, at 48-49. 
60. See id. See also Nichols, supra note 44, at 16. 
61. Amy Bonus and Joyce Barnathan, Staunching the Flow of China's Gulag Exports, 
BUS. WK., April 13, 1992, 50, 51-52. 
62. See G. Pascal Zachary, U.S. Companies Back Chit of Burma, Citing Human-Rights 
Concerns, Graft, WALL ST. J., April 13, 1995, at A10. 
63. See Bailing Out Of Burma, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 2, 1995, §6 (Magazine), at 18; Mc-
Cormick & Levinson, supra note 58, at 50. 
64. See Richard Rapaport, Import Jeans, Export Values: What Happens if a Company's 
Global Reach Exceeds its Ethical Grasp?, FAST COMPANY, Nov. 1993. 
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conduct for international labor rights called the "Reebok Human 
Rights Production Standards."65 
Amnesty International (AI) approached Reebok in 1988 about 
sponsorship of the "Human Rights Now!" tour by rock music groups, 
designed to raise consciousness about human rights. The tour also 
aimed to secure millions of signatures on petitions calling for govern-
ments to observe the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and 
protect human rights activists. Reebok executives worked with their 
then-chief advertising agency, Chiat Day, to underwrite the "Human 
Rights Now!" tour on a budget of $12 million, including advertising 
produced by Chiat Day.66 
The company tied the Reebok name to the tour for marketing 
purposes, but did so in an understated fashion (in fact, several trade 
retailers actually requested less subtlety to help sell more shoes). As 
one executive explained, "[t]he fact that Reebok is making this possi-
ble is important to get across. We are a business entity, and for that 
I don't apologize. But we also care about issues like human rights. 
So, this is not an occasion to blast the name Reebok all over the 
place."67 
T-shirts, sweatshirts and jackets with the AI tour symbol and the 
note "Made possible by Reebok" were sold to concertgoers. Proceeds 
from the sale of these items went to Amnesty International. Reebok 
continues to support Amnesty International's efforts with its own AI 
chapter at the company headquarters and allows employees to use 
company time to write letters on behalf of political prisoners. Some 
Reebok retailers also continue to carry membership applications for j 
Amnesty International in their stores. 
The Reebok Foundation provides video cameras, computers, and 
fax machines, as well as training for human rights advocates, in de-
veloping countries under the "Witness" program.68 This support is 
designed to amplify documentation of human rights conditions and to 
give evidence of violations to the global media, in hopes of providing 
activists with a powerful weapon against abuses. 
Since 1988, Reebok has given annual human rights awards of 
$25,000 each to selected young activists. As the company explains, 
65. See Banning Eyre, Big Business and Human Rights: A constructive engagement or 
a complicated marriage?, RHYTHM MUSIC MAG., Vol IV., No. 2, at 29-33 (1995). 
66. See Bruce Horovitz, Reebok Walks Marketing Tightrope with Human Rights Concert 
Tour, L.A. TIMES, July 26, 1988, pt 4, at 6. 
67. Id. 
68. See Eyre, supra note 65, at 31. 
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"[t]he Reebok Human Rights Award seeks to honor individuals from 
the United States and around the world who have made significant 
contributions to the cause of human rights, often against great odds. 
The purpose of the Award is to shine a positive, international light on 
the awardees and to support their work in human rights.. . . Award 
candidates must be 30 years old or younger and working on an issue 
that directly relates to the United Nations Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights."69 
1. Reebok's Labor Rights Code 
A Reebok executive observes that "[c]onsumers today hold com-
panies accountable for the way products are made, not just the quality 
of the product itself."70 The formulation of the Reebok Human 
Rights Production Standards begins with a statement of the com-
pany's commitment to human rights: "Reebok's devotion to human 
rights worldwide is a hallmark of our corporate culture. As a corpo-
ration in an ever-more global economy we will not be indifferent to 
the standards of our business partners around the world."71 
The Reebok code addresses seven defined areas of labor rights: 
non-ch^crimination, working hours/overtime, forced or compulsory 
labor, fair wages, child labor, freedom of association, and safe and 
healthy work environment. In contrast to the Levi Strauss code, which 
omits any reference to trade union organizing or bargaining rights, 
Reebok's worker rights code declares forthrightly that it "will seek 
business partners that share its commitment to the right of employees 
to establish and join organizations of their own choosing . . . Reebok 
recognizes and respects the right of all employees to organize and 
bargain collectively."72 
Another contrast to the Levi Strauss approach is Reebok's ap-
plication of its labor rights code only to business partners, rather than 
to governments in the countries where it does business. Levi Strauss 
has "terms of engagement" for suppliers and "guidelines" for country 
selection, and the application of those guidelines caused it to with-
draw from China and Burma. In contrast, Reebok has chosen, in the 
69. Reebok Human Rights Award application form, 1993. At the most recent Reebok 
Human Rights Award program, youthful activists from Nepal, Brazil, Liberia, Haiti and 
Pakistan were honored. See Eyre, supra note 65. 
70. See Human Rights Production Standards Set in Worldwide Reebok Initiative, Ree-
bok: Making a Difference, company newsletter, June 1993. 
71. Reebok Human Rights Production Standards (1993) (on file with author, available 
from Reebok corporate offices). 
72. Id. 
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case of China, to ensure that it is not sourcing from contractors em-
ploying prison labor, but not to withdraw altogether.73 
Reebok has entered into joint ventures with factories in China 
rather than have its products manufactured by a government owned 
or third party operated facility under contract. This way, it can both 
manage the workplace environment and assure the quality of the 
shoes produced, factors which company executives believe are posi-
tively correlated. "We believe that the incorporation of international-
ly recognized human rights standards into our business practices im-
proves worker morale and results in a higher quality working envi-
ronment, which in turn helps us produce a higher quality product."74 
Reebok is faced with the ever-present dilemma of using econom-
ic sanctions to enforce social objectives: canceling contracts can harm 
the very workers the policy is supposed to protect by depriving them 
of needed work. Reebok has adopted an "engagement" rather than a 
"sanctions" mode of applying its labor rights standards. It does not 
have the same record of canceled contracts or country pullouts that 
Levis Strauss has demonstrated.75 Instead, Reebok aims to "screen 
out at the outset the factories with poor conditions" rather than "leav-
ing factories and displacing workers."76 
Reebok believes that by maintaining the relationship with a sup-
plier, and the influence that accompanies it, over the long term labor 
rights and conditions will be improved: "[w]e monitor our standards 
assiduously [at the Chinese plants], and we pray that our decision is 
the right one—that there can be constructive engagement."77 
Reebok maintains a three-tiered program of monitoring and en-
forcement of it labor rights code. First, inside its supplier plants, 
Reebok personnel are responsible for assessing labor rights and labor 
conditions and pressing for improvements where needed. Second, 
audit teams from Reebok's international headquarters visit plant sites 
to evaluate conditions and recommend improvements where needed. 
Finally, Reebok has engaged an independent accounting firm to un-
73. See Eyre, supra note 65, at 32-33. 
74. See Human Rights Production Standards Set in Worldwide Reebok Initiative, in 
Reebok: Making a Difference (company newsletter, June 1993) (on file with author, available 
from Reebok corporate offices). 
75. However, Reebok officials report they did force a Chinese supplier factory to move 
employees from a dormitory that was out of compliance with its code of conduct, upon a 
threat of cancelling the supplier's contract. See Eyre, supra note 65, at 32-33. 
76. See Paul Fireman & Doug Cahn, Reebok's human rights record has earned interna-
tional acclaim, BOSTON GLOBE, July 19, 1994, at 14 (letter to the editor). 
77. See Eyre, supra note 65, at 33. 
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dertake payroll audits, interview workers and conduct "focus groups" 
on wages and working conditions.78 
C. A New Initiative: Starbucks Coffee and Guatemalan 
Farmworkers 
A dramatic new corporate initiative on labor rights was taken on 
February 15, 1995 with an announcement by the Starbucks Coffee 
Co. that it would formulate a code of conduct for workers at the 
company's supplier plantations in Guatemala.79 This makes Star-
bucks the first major U.S. corporation to develop its own code of 
conduct in the agricultural commodities sector.80 
The Starbucks move came in response to a "campaign for justice 
for coffee workers" sponsored by U.S. labor rights advocacy groups 
on behalf of Guatemalan coffee workers. Working with the Chicago-
based U.S.-Guatemala Labor Education Project, a coalition of Wash-
ington state religious, labor, and environmental organizations first 
requested meetings with Starbucks officials "to discuss the possibility 
of Starbucks breaking new ground in the areas of corporate responsi-
bility: the establishment of a code of conduct for your business part-
ners abroad who produce the coffee you sell."8 Citing the Levi 
Strauss and Reebok codes and Starbucks' own reputation for having 
a "socially responsible corporate image," the coalition urged the com-
pany to adopt a sourcing code requiring business partners to "pay a 
living wage, respect freedom of association, provide sanitary housing, 
provide safe and healthy workplaces, and not practice discrimi-
nation."82 
In its first response to this activist coalition, the president of 
78. See Fireman & Cahn, supra note 76. 
79. See U.S.-Guatemala Labor Education Project, Big Move for Workers' Rights by 
Starbucks, February 17, 1995 (press release); Sylvia Wieland Nogaki, Coffee's Code of 
Conduct: Starbucks to adopt standards for wages, work conditions for Guatemala workers, 
SEATTLE TIMES, February 16,1995, at CI. 
80. A number of industry-wide private sector commodity agreements contain labor 
rights provisions. In particular, the principal accords among tin, sugar, cocoa and rubber 
producers require fair labor standards. Critics charge, however, that such standards have been 
used more by advanced producers to limit entry into the business than to advance worker 
rights. See Ulrich Kullmann, "Fair Labour Standards " in International Commodity Agree-
ments, 14 J. WORLD TRADE L. 527 (1980). For a view defending such standards (and dis-
cussing their inefficacy), see P. Alston, Commodity Agreements — As Though People Don't 
Matter, 15 J. WORLD TRADE L. 455 (1981). 
81. See letter from John C. Boonstra et. al, Washington Association of Churches, to 
Howard Schulz, President, Starbucks Coffee Co., July 21, 1994 (on file with author). 
82. Id. 
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Starbucks declined to meet with its representatives and refused to 
consider a code of conduct.83 He pointed to Starbucks generous 
support for CARE as Starbucks' chosen expression of social responsi-
bility, stating "[w]hile we understand the purpose of your codes, I'm 
afraid that I cannot in good faith bring our company and our share-
holders in on this project."84 With regard to the Levi Strauss, Ree-
bok and other examples of internal company codes of conduct for 
labor rights, Starbucks' president said "I'm sure that each of these 
companies has their own special circumstances surrounding their 
involvement in the third world countries in which they do business" 
and noted that "when we first sought out the organizations with 
which we planned to partner, we looked carefully and studied their 
programs a great deal."85 He concluded that "[w]e have invested a 
great deal of time nurturing our relationships with the coffee growers 
we do business with, and we truly feel it would not be prudent to im-
pose someone else's sanctions on them now."86 
Following this refusal, the labor rights coalition initiated a public 
communication campaign, including informational picketing at Star-
bucks stores, to pressure the company into adopting the proposed 
code.87 The U.S.-Guatemala Labor Education Project proceeded to 
draft a code of conduct that it offered for Starbucks' adoption as part 
of its campaign.88 By the end of 1994 the campaign was in high 
gear, with informational leafleting at Starbucks stores in major cities 
around the country.89 At this point the campaign took care not to 
call for a boycott, instead urging consumers to write to the company 
asking them to adopt a code of conduct for workers' rights on suppli-
er plantations in Guatemala.90 
83. See letter from Howard Schulz, President, Starbucks Coffee Co., to Rev. John C. 
Boonstra, Washington Association of Churches, August 29, 1994 (on file with author). 
84. Id. at 1. 
85. Id. at 2. 
86. Id. 
87. See Were the Beans for Your Coffee Picked by Workers Earning $2 a Day? and 
other materials from U.S.-Guatemala Labor Education Project, A Campaign for Justice for 
Coffee Workers (on file with author). 
88. See U.S.-Guatemala Labor Education Project, Draft Code for U.S. Coffee Compa-
nies Doing Business in Guatemala—Model: Starbucks (on file with author). The draft code 
contains clauses addressing issues of wages, working hours, forced labor, child labor, free-
dom of association, discrimination, housing, safe and healthy work environment, and moni-
toring. 
89. See Mike Zielinski, Trouble Brewing at Starbucks Coffee, THE PROGRESSIVE, March 
1995, at 12. 
90. See Jim Woolf, Nationwide Coffee Firm is Target of Activists, SALT LAKE TRIB., 
Jan. 9, 1995, at D2. 
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Contrary to what might be expected of a company under such 
pressure, Starbucks did not assume a defensive posture and condemn 
its critics. Behind the scenes, Starbucks officials and leaders of the 
U.S.-Guatemala Labor Education Project and the Washington state 
coalition sustained a confidence-building dialogue through meetings, 
conference calls and correspondence. The Project became convinced 
that Starbucks' social responsibility concern was genuine, and Starbu-
cks was reassured that the Project was not a "company-buster" but 
sincerely interested in improving labor rights and working conditions 
in Guatemala.91 
On February 10,1995, just before its annual shareholders' meet-
ing, the president of Starbucks wrote to the U.S.-Guatemala Labor 
Education Project to confirm that "we will move forward and adopt 
a Starbucks code of conduct."92 Referring to the "campaign for jus-
tice," he remarked "you can understand our frustration at being forced 
to continue to defend our name in response to public relations issues, 
when we could be using our limited resources to begin making prog-
ress towards our goal." 
Rather than simply adopt the code drafted earlier by the Project, 
Starbucks stated its intention to fashion its own code which would be 
"something that works and something that we can live with."94 The 
company said that it would engage in a broad consultation in prepar-
ing a new code: "Since this is a new concept in the agricultural con-
text, we need to take time to research the options and seek help from 
all the constituencies, both internal and external, to reach an under-
standing of all the issues."95 In conclusion, Starbucks declared 
"[w]e accept the challenge to take the lead in adopting a Starbucks 
code of conduct. We don't know what kind of companies you've 
dealt with in the past, but you can be assured that when we say we're 
going to do something, we always come through," and finally, gener-
ously, "[tjhank you for your patience and persistence."96 
91. Interview with Stephen Coats, Executive Director, U.S.-Guatemala Labor Education 
Project, February 24, 1995. 
92. See letter from Howard Behar, President, International and Dave Olsen, Sr. Vice 
President, Starbucks Coffee, to Stephen R. Coats, Executive Director, U.S.-Guatemala Labor 
Education Project, February 10, 1995 (on file with author). 
93. Id. 
94. Id. 
95. Id. Starbucks president Howard Schultz told the company's shareholders he expect-
ed it would take "at least six months" to understand the issues and develop a code. See 
Sylvia Wieland Nogaki, supra note 79. 
96. See supra note 92. 
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IV. CONCLUSION: THE PROBLEM OF CORPORATE VULNERABILITY 
A dilemma faced by any company that charts a proactive course 
in enacting human and labor rights protections is that it can never 
fully satisfy its ideals. Most multinational corporations have not is-
sued human and labor rights codes of conduct, preferring to tersely 
maintain that they obey the laws of the countries where they do busi-
ness. Companies like Levi Strauss, Reebok and Starbucks that claim 
to set a higher standard often suffer the perverse result of becoming 
the targets of criticism. 
Shortly after Levi Strauss received an award from the Council 
on Economic Priorities for its "unprecedented commitment to non-
exploitative work practices in developing countries," reports surfaced 
alleging use of child labor, unsafe conditions and unpaid wages at a 
Levi Strauss supplier plant in Juarez, Mexico.97 Similarly, Reebok 
has been sharply criticized for its reliance on supplier facilities in 
Indonesia, where wage levels, though higher than the minimum, are 
lower than estimates of what is needed for the basic necessities of 
life, and where the military-dominated government suppresses inde-
pendent trade union organization.98 
Levi Strauss, Reebok and Starbucks are not alone in moving 
toward codes of conduct on human and labor rights in their interna-
tional operations. Sears, JCPenney, Wal-Mart, Home Depot, Philips 
Van-Heusen, Timberland and others have all adopted similar mea-
sures for their overseas subsidiaries and suppliers.99 Many compa-
nies have adopted codes of conduct on global environmental practic-
es.100 The code of conduct phenomenon is also prevalent domesti-
cally, where many U.S. companies have formulated codes for Ameri-
97. See Laurie Udesky, Sweatshops Behind the Labels: The 'Social Responsibility' Gap, 
THE NATION, May 16, 1994, at 665-67. 
98. See "Labor Rights Group Asserts Reebok Human Rights Award Marred by Com-
pany's Exploitative Production Practices," press release from International Labor Rights 
Education and Research Fund, December 10,1991 (on file with author). On wage levels, see 
Jeffrey Ballinger, The New Free Trade Hell, HARPER'S MAG., Aug. 1992, at 46-47 (discuss-
ing salaries at a Nike contractor). On trade union suppression, see Thomas L. Friedman, 
Bentsen Prods Indonesia on Rights of Workers, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 18, 1994, at D6. 
99. See McCormick & Levinson, supra note 58, at 48-49. Generally, these companies' 
codes of conduct are available from corporate offices upon request 
100. See Stan Hinden, Joan Bavaria's Crusade for the Environment: Social Activist is 
Driving Force Behind the Valdez Principles, a Corporate Code of Conduct, WASH, POST, 
Dec. 23, 1990, at HI. 
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can labor, environmental and other social concerns. 
As we have seen, several factors are promoting the emergence 
of corporate codes of conduct that protect human and labor rights in 
multinational enterprises. There is a genuine humanitarian impulse at 
work in many cases, whether it starts with individual corporate lead-
ers shaped by personal experiences, or as a consensus arrived at by 
a more collective company leadership. Often the altruistic motive 
coincides with "bottom line" considerations related to brand name, 
company image and other intangibles that are part of a company's 
assets. For some advocates of corporate social responsibility, the 
motivation is more action-oriented than a product of reflection: 
[T]he most important contribution of the members of the 
socially responsible business movement... is that they are 
leading by trying to do something, to risk, to take a chance, 
to make a change—any change. They're not waiting for 
"the solution" but acting creatively without guarantee of 
102 
success. 
From outside the enterprise, a more traditional pressure common 
in the modern regulatory state has an effect. Governments seeking 
to mandate behavior by companies are devising laws and regulations 
for labor rights in international trade, as in the Generalized System of 
Preferences and other U.S. trade statutes.103 International regulation 
is also beginning to appear, as in NAFTA, the European Union and 
perhaps next in the new World Trade Organization. 
A traditional response by corporations to such "mandates," as 
they are known in U.S. regulatory discourse, is an assertion of self-
regulation that will allow for individual differences and needs while 
still achieving the overall social goal. From an historical perspective 
since the early 20th century, this pre-emptive thrust toward corporate 
self-governance on social matters has been more of an orderly retreat 
than an offensive movement. But in the new, market-driven global 
economy where the regulatory state is coming under greater criticism, 
self-regulation by means of codes of conduct on human and labor 
rights may enjoy a greater chance to prove its effectiveness. 
101. For a broad survey of company initiatives, see JOEL MAKOWER, BEYOND THE 
BOTTOM LINE (1994); see also Leslie Crutchfield and Luba Vangelova, Can Companies 
Care?, WHO CARES, Summer 1994, at 28-32. 
102. See Hawken & McDonough, supra note 17, at 92. 
103. See supra note 7. 
104. On NAFTA, see supra note 8; on the WTO, see supra note 11; on the European 
Union, see Treaty on European Union and Final Act, Feb. 7,1992, Protocol on Social Policy, 
31 I.L.M. 247, 357 [hereinafter Maastricht Treaty]. 
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Drafting the content of such codes is relatively easy. Good mod-
els exist in United Nations human rights instruments, in International 
Labor Organization conventions, in codes drafted by multilateral 
governmental or economic coordinating bodies, and in the formula-
tions adopted by the companies studied here. Effective implementa-
tion is the real test of such codes. Companies sincerely interested in 
making them work will have to create credible enforcement regimes 
to back them up, characterized by such elements as: 
* assigning responsibility for attaining compliance to a 
named, on-site individual manager; 
* ongoing auditing and reporting on labor rights and 
labor conditions in company operations, either by 
independent examiners or, if by company officials, 
with results subject to independent verification; 
* surprise visits to production facilities by independent 
auditors and by senior management officials; 
* creating avenues of recourse for workers to invoke the 
code of conduct, with guarantees of non-reprisal; 
* no-nonsense enforcement of the code, including can-
cellation of contracts, termination of responsible man-
agers, withdrawal from offending countries and simi-
lar sanctions; 
* a willingness to accept trade union representation and 
collective bargaining where workers desire them, even 
if the firm's preference is to remain non-union; 
* adding an independent human rights and labor (or 
environmental, in the case of an environmental code) 
advocate to the corporation's board of directors, or 
otherwise opening the board to independent advocacy. 
* regular public reporting on labor rights progress, and 
continuing dialogue with labor and human rights ad-
vocacy groups. 
To become a permanent and positive feature of the global econo-
my, private codes of conduct devised by firms to generate respect for 
worker rights in their international operations must be more than 
eccentricities. It remains to be seen if such codes are the exception or 
are part of a general trend. Initiatives like those reviewed here could 
remain the practice of a handful of companies who do not want their 
brand names associated in the minds of consumers with child labor 
or other labor rights abuses. 
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Meanwhile, the rest of the international corporate community, 
whose sales are principally made to other companies or governments, 
rather than consumers, might refuse to develop their own codes of 
conduct and resist codes offered for their adoption by governments or 
by NGOs. The result of such indifference on a broad scale will be 
escalating pressure from advocacy groups for mandatory international 
fair labor standards linked explicitly to trade agreements and backed 
by trade sanctions. 
On the other hand, perhaps forward-looking corporate leaders 
and strategists will recognize the value of integrating human and 
labor rights concerns into their global employment policies. They 
might move in this direction not just to avoid offending consumers, 
but for a beneficial effect such codes will have on employee involve-
ment, training and productivity. 
In the same way that a "first generation" of civil and political 
rights emerged in the human rights field, to be followed by "second" 
and ''third'' generation rights that expanded the scope of human 
rights,105 the corporate codes of conduct that have taken shape re-
cently can be said to be the first generation. They are limited to those 
companies with a direct interest in demonstrating a positive human 
rights record. A "second generation" might lie in making such codes 
the rule rather than the exception in the international corporate com-
munity, and finding creative methods for making them effective, not 
just hortatory. Perhaps after that, a third generation of corporate social 
responsibility will find respect for human rights a "matter of course," 
rather than just a matter of "altruism," as envisioned by visionary 
proponents of corporate social responsibility.106 
105. For a discussion of the "generations" analysis of international human rights, see 
Burns H. Weston, Human Rights, in HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE WORLD COMMUNITY: ISSUES 
AND ACTION (Richard Pierre Claude and Burns H. Weston, eds., 2nd ed. 1992) 1*4-31. 
106. See Hawken & McDonough, supra note 17, at 80. 
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